So the most of the story on the "Hawaiian Missile Crisis" is out now, and if you were a member of the "prolly a Dem who wanted to make Trump look bad" club, you seem to be out of luck. However, if you are in the "I enjoy a stupid mistake that could have cost lives" group, I am about to make you happy beyond your wildest dreams.
Step one: Overdo a bad thing
The first problem was a case of the Law of Large Numbers coming through yet again. "The FCC said Hawaii officials were conducting an “atypical number of no-notice drills” that increased the chances of a mistake happening. " (from the FoxNews article.) So why all the drills?
A state official has informed residents of Hawaii that they should create a plan to keep track of their families in the event of a nuclear attack from North Korea, which is about 4,600 miles away. "There will be no time to call our loved ones, pick up our kids and find a designated shelter," Vern Miyagi, an administrator with the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency, told reporters. (Newsweek)
In fact, my calculations show that if an ICBM went straight to target at full speed, you would have 18 minutes. Of course, the missile goes in an arc, which adds to that, and there is the additional fact that they have to actually HIT the target:
What's more, the current estimated accuracy of North Korea's weapons may be as poor as six to 12 miles. (US and Russian missiles can hit a target within a couple of hundred feet.) If North Korea targeted San Francisco, for example, there's a chance the bomb could miss the city entirely and detonate over the Pacific Ocean. (Business Insider)
Step two: Let's make sure no one communicates
Next, let's have a third shift supervisor decide to run one of these apparently too-often tests- schedule it for shift change- and NOT tell the first shift supervisor, at least so he knew what was happening.
When he was handing over at 8am, the outgoing supervisor told the incoming day shift supervisor that he was going to conduct a ballistic missile preparedness drill.
“But there was a miscommunication,” said James Wiley, an FCC legal counsel who presented the report. “The incoming day shift supervisor thought that the midnight shift supervisor intended to conduct a drill for the midnight shift warning officers only (those ending their shift) – not for the day shift officers (those beginning their shift).” (the Guardian)
And thus, no one was paying attention to the key employee, AKA...
Step three: wrong man for the job
During the investigation, (investigating officer Brig. Gen. Bruce) Oliveira said the employee, who had worked at the agency for 10 years, had a history of confusing drills and real-world events. In fact, the worker had made similar mistakes twice before, officials said. (Fox)
According to state officials, the watch officer had been a cause for concern to his colleagues for more than a decade. (Guardian)
Oh, now there's a brilliant job by Hawaii HR, no? Andlet's not give the bozo an easy job, either...
Step four: Make it
So you take a message just like this, but add "exercise, exercise, exercise" to each end. And give it to Mr. Can't tell the difference, and watch what happens...
Step five: add selective hearing
In a written statement, the employee, who was not identified, said he believed there was a real emergency on Jan. 13 after hearing a recording that stated “THIS IS NOT A DRILL.” But the employee did not hear the first half of the message that stated “EXERCISE, EXERCISE, EXERCISE,” the FCC said in its preliminary report Tuesday. Though the recording also ended with the “EXERCISE” message, the officer did not hear it. (Fox)
During the news conference Tuesday, officials reiterated that the male worker said he did not know it was a drill even though five others had heard the portion of the message indicating it was an exercise. (NBC)
So he semi-legitimately thought he was going to be turned into a radioactive souvenir ashtray in mere moments. And he did what anyone like him would do at a time like that. He confirmed a live missile on the way. And when told it was a drill....
Step six: Swift and decisive... er...
After the mistake was realized, the employee reportedly “froze” and “seemed confused,” forcing another worker to take over and send a correction, Oliveira said. (Fox)
Okay, so the next guy corrected things, right? RIGHT?
By 8:20 a.m., Hawaii EMA tweeted there was “NO missile threat” to the state, but failed to send a follow-up phone alert for another 38 minutes, causing mass panic among people who weren’t able to check social media. (Fox).
So, two problems here- one, why did it take 13 minutes to figure out how to remove the now-frozen idiot from his chair, and send out the text? Two, why is the phone alert not tied TO the text alert and vice versa? I mean, other than as the investigation found, the need to "recommended a number of improvements on the system including a revised checklist to standardize the process of conducting drills and installing a computer process that would immediately send out an “alert cancellation,” the latter of which has been instituted already"?
But never fear, the heroic governor of Hawaii is about to save the day...
Step seven: It's on a card in my... wallet... it's right here...
It was not until 8.24am that the corrective message was retweeted by the Hawaii governor, David Ige.
The FCC report notes drily: “The governor has stated that he was unable to do this earlier because he did not know his Twitter password.”
And with that, all that remains is...
Step eight: the aftermath, or 'bring to a boil and stir...'
So Vern Miyagi, who oversaw the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency, resigned after the presser today. The button pushing alert guy became the "former button pushing alert guy", another "official" walked the plank prior to execution (my guess is that was the third shift supervisor- or perhaps the guy that keeps the governor's passwords), and still another is "in process of being suspended without pay".
God hopes they don't notify him with a text message...